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SECURITIES LAWS: THE EXCLUSIVITY OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION UNDER SECTION 18 OF THE 1934 ACT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP

lOb-5, Ross v. A.H. Robins, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
TO RULE

INTRODUCTION

The issue resolved in Ross v. A.H. Robins' concerns the viability
of an action filed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 and rule lOb-53 when section 18' of the same Act contains an express civil remedy. Section 18 imposes liability for making "any statement in any.., document filed... ; which statement was... false
and misleading with respect to any material fact"' to one who relies
upon such statement and purchases or sells securities at a price affected
by the statement. Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 make it "unlawful for
any person, . . . to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." 6
607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
Section 18 states:
Liability for misleading statements
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in
subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time in the
light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity
in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its
discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suits, and
assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party
litigant.
(b) Every person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may
recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the
original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment.
(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section
unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the
cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued.
6. Section 10b states:
Manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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To decide this issue the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first examined the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Exchange
Acts. The court also examined the differences between the two sections
to determine the exclusivity of section 18. The court concluded that
section 18 did not provide an exclusive remedy. Thus section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 could be used. Finally, the court examined rule 9(b), of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine the sufficiency of the
pleadings of the plaintiffs.
Facts and Holdings
Defendant A.H. Robins is a pharmaceutical company. Other named defendants in the suit were directors and/or officers of the company. 8 In its 1970 and 1971 annual reports, Robins released information about a new intrauterine birth control device it had developed, the
Dalkon Shield. 9 The annual reports and press releases issued by the
company in 1973 and 1974 stated that the device was safe and effective. These company reports were enthusiastic about the effect its
marketing would have on the company. 0 In July 1973, plaintiffs
Kalman and Anita Ross bought 100 shares of A.H. Robins stock. In
May of the following year "information about the serious medical
problems which were resulting from the use of the Dalkon Shield
began to be disclosed to the public.""II Problems with the Shield included septic abortions and other severe complications. Over 500 promeans or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operate or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See note 19 infra.
8. 607 F.2d at 547.
9. Id. at 548.
10. Id. at 550.
11. Id. As of September 1980, the number of product liability suits pending
against Robins was 4,460. Dayton Journal Herald, Sept. 28, 1980, at 28, col. 1.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/11
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duct liability suits were instituted and the value of Robins stock dropped from $19 to $13 per share."
The plaintiffs instituted a class action suit on March 23, 1977. This
complaint was dismissed but leave was given to amend. The June 1,
1978 amended complaint, which was also dismissed by the district
court, was the subject of this appeal.' 3 According to the appellate
court:
The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendants manipulated
and artificially inflated the market price of Robins' common stock
by disseminating false and misleading information about the effectiveness and safety of the Dalkon Shield, . . . and by failing to
reveal information which indicated that the shield was less effective and more, dangerous than the company's earlier public
4
statements had indicated.
In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants "knew or
recklessly disregarded the fact that there were serious questions as to
the safety and efficiency of the Dalkon Shield." 5 This claim as based
on information contained in an unpublished study that indicated the
Shield was not as effective in preventing pregnancies as Robins had
claimed and that severe complications were possible.' 6 Because of
misstatements in 10-k forms, press releases, and Annual Reports,
prices were inflated when plaintiffs bought their stock.
At the district level the court considered whether to allow a suit
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when section 18 of the same act provided a civil remedy. A question of the sufficiency of the complaint was also presented.' 7 After analyzing both
sections the court concluded that section 18 provided the exclusive civil
remedy for material misstatements and omissions contained in
documents filed with the Securities Exchange Commission. 8
On the procedural issue the district court concluded that the complaint did not meet the "particularity" requirement of the Federal
12. 607 F.2d at 547 n.1.
13. Id. at 547.
14. Id. at 548 n. 5.
15. Id. at 548.
16. Id. The plaintiffs based their claim that defendant knew or recklessly
disregarded on the unpublished study of Mary Gabrielson, set out in full in a footnote
to the court's opinion. Some of the information contained in Gabrielson's report included the findings that; (1) pregnancy rates were higher than claimed by Robins; (2)
the removal of the Shield caused more pain, infections and bleeding than the 1970 annual report stated; (3) there were no studies conducted longer than 5.5 months on the

Shield.
17.

465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

18.

Id. at 913.
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Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b).' 9 Two pleading deficiencies were found.
First, the complaint failed to state the time at which defendants
allegedly knew or recklessly disregarded the undisclosed information. 0
Second, the complaint did not set forth "the circumstances which lead
[plaintiffs] to believe that the defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the information contained in the 1972 study prior to their own purchase of Robins common stock."" The complaint was dismissed with
prejudice because the plaintiffs had already been given an opportunity
to amend.
On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded by the Second Circuit of Appeals. The appellate court questioned "whether allowing invocation of the section 10(b) remedy would impermissibly nullify the
limitations and requirements inherent in section 18." 22 It held that
"section 18 did not provide an exclusive remedy and that plaintiffs
could proceed under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. ' ' 23 While the court
upheld the lower court's decision regarding pleading deficiencies, it
chose to allow the plaintiffs another opportunity to amend, rather
than foreclose a possibly successful claim.
Rationale For Holding
A.

History and Analysis of sections 10(b) and 18

The court's holding in Ross v. A.H. Robins turned upon its interpretations of sections 10(b), 18 and rule lOb-5. To analyze these sections the court examined the legislative histories of the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. Two of the objectives of the 1933 Act
were "to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate
diclosure ... and to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities." ' 24 The
1934 Act was designed to prohibit market manipulation, to regulate exchanges, and to regulate trading in over-the-counter-deals. 2 The main
objective of the 1934 Act is to change the doctrine of caveat emptor in
favor of a policy of full disclosure. Therefore, these acts should be in19. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) states: "(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In
all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally."
20. 465 F. Supp. at 909.
21. Id.
22. 607 F.2d at 553.
23. Id. at 556.

24. Gadsby, Historical Development of the SEC - The Government View, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 7,9 (1959).
25. Id. at 10. See also Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 217 (1959).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss1/11
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terpreted broadly to achieve their purpose of preventing fraud.2 6 Fur7
thermore, the two acts are to be read in pari materia.1
Section 10(b) gives the Securities and Exchange Commission power
to promulgate rules and regulations as the need arises. In 1942 the
Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rule 10b-5 pursuant
to its power under section 10(b). 2 1 Neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5
provides for a private right of action.2 9 Nevertheless, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 30, a private right of action was implied from section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. This implied right has never been rejected by
the Supreme Court and was explicitly accepted by it in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Store.3"

It appears that before the mid-seventies the use of rule lOb-5 was
allowed to cover acts expressly prohibited by another section.1 2 With
the Supreme Court decisions of Blue Chip Stamps and Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder,33 a new trend emerged in which the Court limited the
expansion of securities liabilities. In Ernst the Supreme Court noted
that the availability of a rule lOb-5 action when an exclusive remedy
was provided had not yet been decided. 3 ' District courts in Michigan,
26. Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681, 686 (N.D. I11.1976).
27. Ernst & Ernst ,. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). For further examination of the legislative histories and purposes of the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933
and 1934 see K. BLLKIN, THE 10B SERIES OF RULES (1975); A. BROMBERG & L.
LOWENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD (1979) [hereinafter cited as
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD]; 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION

(2d ed. 1961).
28. See note 6 supra. Section 10(b) allows "such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate ...

"

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)

(1976).
29. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The court
stated that there wasn't any indication that either Congress or the Commission had
considered the possibility of private suits arising under these sections. See generally
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, note

30.
31.

27 supra.

69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).

32. 1 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, supra note 27, § 2.4 at 401.
See also Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
Another trend of importance was the one which allowed section 10(b) actions when
the defendant's conduct was only negligent, 22 VAND. L. REv. 359, 367 (1969). See

also Plaintiff's Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 158
(1978), which stated that the emerging tend toward loosening the standard of care was
abruptly halted by Ernst.

33. 425 U.S. 185 (1976); 1 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, supra
note 27, § 2.4 at 384.2. See also 607 F.2d at 554.
34. 1 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, supra note 27, § 2.4 at 384.5.
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Footnote 31 in Ernst states
that "we need not consider the question whether a cause of action may be maintained
under section 10(b) on the basis of actions that would constitute a violation of section
18." See also 1 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, supra note 27, § 2.4 at
384.5.
Published by eCommons, 1981
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Washington, D.C., and Texas have construed the Court's dictum to
mean that there is no implied right of action under lOb-5 when a suit
can be brought under section 18."1
From the recent Supreme Court decisions Touche Ross v.
Redington,3 6 Ernst & Ernst, and Blue Chip Stamps, the argument can
be made "that section 10(b) could be viewed as a 'catch-all' provision
intended to prevent the use of manipulative and deceptive devices not
proscribed by other provisions of the Act." ' 3 Although Ernst did not
reach the issue presented by Ross, the court implied that section 10(b)
could not be so broadly used.3 The Second Circuit in Ross, however,
decided that rule lOb-5 required substantially different proof than was
necessary under section 18. Because of these differences, the court held
plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. 9
In Ross, the court decided that the history of the statute was not
determinative of the issue. The cases concerning the implied right of
action under rule lOb-5 were held inapplicable because the court was
not considering a new implied right. ° The real issue, according to the
Id. See also Kulchok v. Government Employees Ins. Co., [1977-1978] FED.
96,602 (D.D.C. 1977); and Note, Exclusivity of Express Remedy
Under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
845 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Exclusivity of Express Remedy]. See also note 62 supra.
36. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
37. 607 F.2d at 554.
38. Id. at 551. See note 34 supra.
39. Id. at 555.
40. Id. at 553. The court disregarded the defendants' argument that the case was
controlled by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453 (1974) (holding that the exclusive remedies under one section of the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) precluded the finding of an implied cause of action).
The Ross court also disregarded the case the plaintiff considered to be controlling,
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The court in Cort stated four principles to be used to
determine when to imply a private right of action under a federal statute. The four
questions which must be asked are:
1. Does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
2. Is there any indication of legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy?
3. Is it consistent with the underlying scheme of the legislation to imply such a remedy?
4. Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law? 422 U.S. at 78.
In Ross these questions were not considered because the court decided that it was not
implying a private right of action, but rather was determining if an already established
implied right could be used where an exclusive remedy was also provided. 607 F.2d at
553.
In Exclusivity of Express Remedy, supra note 35, the author examined the exclusivity of section 18 in light of the four questions presented in Cort. The conclusion
reached is that the second, third, and fourth questions all fail to pass the test and that
section 18 should be the exclusive remedy for misstatements or omission contained in
documents filed with the SEC. Id. at 858-60.
35.

SEC. L. REP. CCH
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Ross court, was whether a plaintiff could use rule lOb-5 when section
18 provided express civil remedies for misstatements or omissions contained in documents filed with the SEC. The court next examined one
of its previous decisions, Fischman v. Raytheon.," Fischman involved
analysis of a conflict between section 11 and section 10(b) to decide
whether there was a rationale for allowing a 10b-5 action
when an ex42
press civil remedy was provided in another section.
The court in Ross relied heavily on its holding in Fischman. In
Fischman, preferred and common stockholders were trying to sue the
company under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The common
stockholders, however, did not have a claim, since they had not purchased securities discussed in the prospectus and registration statement
at issue. Thus the district court in Fischman held that the common
stockholders could not sue under section 10(b). This holding was reversed in a decision at the appellate level, which held section 11 did not
require proof of fraud while rule lOb-5 did.4 3 Therefore, the court
reasoned that Congress intended that section 10(b) be used by victims
of fraud. The court indicated that the presence of fraud activates section 10(b), regardless of whether the action could be maintained under
section 11.44
The integral finding for the court in Ross, to allow the activation
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, would be that element of fraud plus a
finding that the burden of proof would be heavier under section 10(b)
than section 18. This finding would negate the need for the reliance requirements of section 18.4
It is necessary to distinguish proving a primafacie case under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 from proceeding under section 18. Section 18
requires that a plaintiff establish knowledge of and reliance upon the
6
alleged misstatements contained in any document filed with the SEC.
The defendant in a section 18 action can avoid liability if he can "prove
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false or misleading.'"4 Section 18 is also limited by the procedural
requirements that suit be filed within the statute of limitations and that
48
a discretionary bond for reasonable costs of the suit be posted.
41.

188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).

42.

Id. at 785. See also 607 F.2d at 555.

43.
44.
45.
46.
note 27,
47.
48.

188 F.2d at 785.
Id. at 786.
607 F.2d at 555.
Id. at 552. See also 4 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
§ 8.4 at 204.97. See note 2 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); see note 5 supra.
Id.
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Pleading requirements under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are different from those under section 18. Reliance under section 10(b) may
be "presumed once the materiality of an omission is established, . . .
or the material misrepresentation affected the price of stock traded on
the open market." 49 Section 10(b) has no bond requirement and its
statute of limitations varies with governing state law. To the court, the
most important difference was the scienter requirement in proving and
pleading a section 10(b) violation. The court noted that Ernst & Ernst
established the need to prove that a defendant acted with scienter to sustain a section 10(b) action. Like the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst,5'
the appellate court failed to define "scienter."
In Ross the court held that the difference in the burdens facing the
plaintiff under section 10(b) as compared with section 18 was critical.
Because of the greater burden with the former, the court dispensed
with the reliance requirement. Under section 10(b) the burden of proving scienter is on the plaintiff, while under section 18 the burden is
upon the defendant to prove "good faith or no knowledge." 5 , According to the court, "the far more difficult task which confronts a plain607 F.2d at 553 (citations and footnotes omitted).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 193. Footnote 12 is as follows:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for
some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances,
reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and rule lob-5.
Id. n.12 (emphasis added). However, the dissent of Justice Blackmun stated that the
Congressional intent to provide a remedy to investors should be construed to extend
lOb-5 liability to cover negligent activity. Id. at 215-17.
See also Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter under Rule
lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977).
ranging
In this article Bucklo states that "[sicienter is a many faceted concept ....
from intention to deceive, to knowledge of undisclosed facts, to a reckless failure to
acquire knowledge of the true facts. . . .[T]he court failed to state explicitly whether
scienter is present even when knowledge is shown but when there is no proof of an intent to deceive." Id. at 214 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
With the above quotes in mind, consider the implications of the following. Suppose
that somewhere in Robins' files a copy of Mary Gabrielson's study is discovered. Has a
primafacie case been made? Is the good faith defense still open to the defendant? Is
the necessary scienter present since knowledge is shown although there is no showing
of defendant's intent to deceive? These questions become even more difficult to
answer in this case because of the area involved. Common experiences in past years
have shown the danger of placing drugs and devices on the market without adequate
testing. The thalidomide problem in the early sixties and the toxic shock syndrome of
the late seventies are two well-known examples of what can occur. For a definition of
recklessness, see W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 184 (4th ed. 1971).
52. 607 F.2d at 556. See note 5 supra.
49.
50.
51.
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tiff seeking to proceed under section 10(b) provides a rationale for
dispensing with the reliance requirement inherent in section 18."',
The court in Ross failed to explain the meaning or importance of
the procedural differences between section 10(b) and section 18.
Although the court called these differences "significant," 4 it gave no
explanation why they were not given further consideration. Perhaps
the court's decision on the scienter burden issue was enough to override any concern it may have had with the procedural differences between the two statutes." The court in Ross presented several reasons
why the plaintiff could proceed under section 10(b). First was its view
that a plaintiff who had to plead and prove scienter had a more difficult problem than one who had only to plead reliance and material

misrepresentation.

36

Second, the court said that to hold "conduct is not proscribed by
section 10(b) merely because it is also subject to section 18 would effectively deprive open market investors who relied on misleading market
information of any remedy simply because the misinformation hap' In the appellate
pened to be lodged in a form filed with the SEC." 57
court's view, "even if plaintiffs were able to prove the defendant's
wrongdoing, under the district court's view that section 18 provides the
exclusive basis of liability for misstatements contained in filed reports,
they would be left without a remedy.""
The court in Ross also stated that, given the intention to use lOb-5
to aid open market investors, an incongruous result would be reached
if an investor's remedy would be closed out simply because the
documents were filed with the SEC." 9 Another justification given by
the court was that "no rational purpose . . . would be furthered by
creating a structure where liability for material misrepresentation
adversely affecting investors would vary tremendously depending upon
53.

607 F.2d at 556.

54. Id. at 553 n.16.
55. Id. at 556; see text accompanying note 46 supra; see also text accompanying
notes 56-61 infra.
56. 607 F.2d at 556.
57. Id. But see SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, supra note 27,
where Bromberg stated that few people actually see or rely on the documents filed pursuant to the 1934 Act. 4 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, supra note 27,
§ 8.4 at 204.96-97.
As long as lob-5 can be used for investors who rely on press releases or such containing material misstatements or omissions, valid claims will not be closed out. See
Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [current] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 96,760
(N.D. Tex. 1978). See note 73 infra.
58. 607 F.2d at 553.

59. Id. at 556.
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whether the statement happened to be filed with the SEC." 60 Finally
the court said that its holding would discourage corporate managers
from including "their misrepresentations in material filed with the
SEC., for the sole purpose of insulating themselves from liability
under section 10(b) and restricting the class of potential plaintiffs to
the unlikely few who actually viewed and relied on the misleading information." 6' These justifications will be discussed in light of an opposite holding.
This issue of the exclusivity of section 18 has not been addressed
recently by any other appellate court. District courts have answered the
question both ways.6 2 The most extensive and well reasoned opinion
presenting a view opposite Ross is Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors.6 3 In Pearlstein the plaintiff brought a class action under 10(b)
and rule lOb-5. 6 ' Plaintiff alleged that material misrepresentations
were made and material facts omitted by defendant in various annual
reports, press releases, and reports filed with the SEC.6 5 According to
this court, before Ernst & Ernst, implied actions were permitted under
section 10(b) even though the action could be brought under section
18.66

In Pearlstein, the court analyzed the differences between section
10(b) and section 18. In its opinion the burden of proving scienter had
little importance.6 7 According to the court, "[alpart from the burden
of proof, the scienter requirement for the causes of action under the
two sections are essentially the same." '6 8 Next the Pearlstein court ex60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Cases holding that section 18 was not the exclusive remedy include Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., 461 F.Supp. 999 (D.D.C.
1978); Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Fischer v. Kletz 266 F.
Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1968) (impliedly allowed lob-5 though not stated by court); Rekant v. Desser, 425
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1972) (10b-5 action allowed when one annual report was misleading
and the next one was late.)
The following cases have held that section 18 provides the exclusive remedy: McKee
v. Federals Inc., [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,958 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage Investors, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,760 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); Berman v. Richford Indus., Inc., [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,518
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kulchok v. Government Employees Ins. Co., [1977-1978] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,002 (D.D.C. 1977).
63. .[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 1 96,760 at 84,474 (N.D.Tex. 1978).
64. Id. at 84,475.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 84,477.

68.

Id.
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amined the reliance, causation, and materiality standards of each
statute. The court held that in each of these areas the requirements of
proof under section 18 are "no less difficult than proving a similar action under section 10(b)." 69
Having reached this conclusion, directly opposite from the one
reached in Ross, the court held that in actions concerning
misstatements or omissions in documents filed with the SEC, plaintiffs
must proceed under section 18.70 The rationale for this holding was
that "the plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid the procedural requirements of section 18, when no greater obligation is imposed upon
him by the implied action of section 10(b)." 7 ' The court said that if
given the choice most plaintiffs would proceed under section 10(b),
thereby eliminating any need for section 18.72
One could argue that plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed under
lOb-5 in view of the broad intent of Congress to prevent fraud and
allow investors remedies. On the other hand a more restrictive view
could be taken that allowing plaintiffs recovery under lOb-5 would virtually eliminate any need for section 18. The Ross court's holding
would be justifiable if its rationale concerning the consequences were
proven true. If corporate directors filed documents with the SEC simply to avoid 10(b)-5 liability, then a lOb-5 action should be permitted.
At this time, however, the court's rationale appears to be unjustified. 3
As long as information contained in documents both filed and not
filed with the SEC can be the basis of 10b-5 action, no possibly
meritorious plaintiff will be closed out.7 '" There is no support for the
claim that Congressional intent was that section 10(b) should provide
relief regardless of whether an expressed remedy was already
provided.75 If evidence showing companies deliberately file all
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The court in Pearlstein also addressed and answered a question foreclosed by
the decision in Ross. The question deals with the breadth and scope of section 18.
[1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760 at 84,477 (N.D. Tex 1978). Should material
in press releases (or any other document not filed with the SEC) come under section 18
if the material in those releases is similar or identical to documents filed with the SEC?
The court decided that section 18 should not "be extended to cover these unfiled
documents, especially in light of a number of decisions which have held that reliance
on the actual filed document is required under that section." Id. The court allowed the
plaintiffs' 10(b) action based on the quarterly reports and press releases to continue.
74. Id.
75. See note 21. See also Exclusivity of Express Remedy, supra note 35, at 850-52
in which the statutory tort theory and the statutory voidability theory are used to explain the implied lOb-5 remedy. Briefly, the statutory tort theory is that a statute
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documents containing material misstatements and omissions to avoid
responsibility becomes available, the legislature will be able to intervene and either eliminate section 18 or expand the scope of rule
lOb-5 to cover the acts in question.
Finally, the current trend of Supreme Court decision, is to restrict
the availability of rule lOb-5 actions. Although the Court has not
directly answered the question whether section 18 provides the exclusive remedy, indications are that it would not view favorably further
expansion of rule lOb-5. By denying certiorari in the Ross case,
however, the Court has postponed deciding the issue. Because use of
section 18 is not extensive, the opportunity for the Court to decide this
issue may be far in the future.
B.

Pleading Requirements under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 9(b)

After allowing the action to be brought under section 10(b) the
Ross court examined the pleadings to determine whether the lower
court's dismissal of the complaint was proper. The appellate court
reversed the dismissal, giving plaintiffs a final opportunity to amend,
even though the pleadings were deficient.
According to Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 9(b), when a plaintiff pleads "all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity."7 6 This does not mean that
9(b) pleadings must be long or complex. "Rule 9(b) must be read in the
light of rule 8(b). While fraud must be particularized, the allegations
must still be short, plain, simple, concise, and direct as is reasonable
under the circumstances." 7 7
The Ross court considered the pleading requirement's policies of
notice and protection of defendants from spurious claims. It held the
pleadings were deficient in four respects. 8 The court stated "[a] defendescribes standard of conduct established by the legislation. See W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 190-204 (4th ed. 1971). Since investors were the class of people to be
protected by section 10(b), violation of that statute should allow them some remedy.
The statutory voidability theory is based upon section 29(b) of the 1934 Act. That
section voids every contract made in violation of any provision of the Act. "[S]ection
29(b) supports a broad private remedy under rule lOb-5 by reasoning that any
fraudulent purchase or sale of a security rests on a contract violative of rule lob-5 and
that section 29(b) would be ineffective unless the innocent party to the void contract
could apply to the courts for a remedy." Exclusivity of Express Remedy, supra note
35, at 851.
The court in Ross considered neither of these theories because it was not implying a
new remedy.
76. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 326 (3d ed. 1976).
See also note 13 supra.
77. Id.
78. 607 F.2d at 557.
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dant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to answer the complaint
'' 9
and must be given adequate information to frame a response.
The first of the deficiencies concerned the circumstances that
would give rise to fraud. The court in Ross held the complaint failed to
plead how defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the question of
the safety and efficiency of the Dalkon Shield. Plaintiffs gave no in80
dication defendants had knowledge of the Shield's inefficiency.
A second deficiency was the failure to specify when defendants
came into the possession of information indicating inefficiency of the
Shield. 8 Only if the defendants acquired this knowledge, and hence a
duty to disclose it, before the plaintiffs bought Robins stock would the
plaintiffs be proper class representatives.
The court held that "[iut is reasonable to require that the plaintiffs
specifically plead those events which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had knowledge of the facts contained in
paragraph 18 dealing with Mary Gabrielson's report of the complaint
or recklessly disregarded their existence." 8 Plaintiffs do not have to
plead defendant's actual knowledge.8 3
Finally, by failing to specify the time period in which the stock fell
from $19 to $13 per share the plaintiffs made it impossible to determine if any loss has been suffered." Because the Federal rules were
designed to deemphasize the pleadings and encourage litigation to
reach the claims, the court allowed the plaintiffs a final opportunity to
conform their pleadings. 85
CONCLUSION

The court's decision follows a trend which saw the growth of
private actions under lOb-5 to become "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 8 6 This expansion has
decisions in Ernst &
been limited in the 1970's by the Supreme Court's
87
Ernst, Blue Chip Stamps and Touche Ross.
Legislative history is sparse concerning the intent and reach of
lOb-5. Strong policy reasons exist for both allowing and disallowing a
lOb-5 action when section 18 provides an exclusive remedy. An action
79. Id. at 557-58.
80. Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559.

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 557. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
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should be allowed if the remedial aspect of the 1934 Act is considered
most important. If the courts decide that less judicial and more
legislative activity is needed to clarify the situation, then section 18
should be the exclusive remedy.
The court in Ross decided that because the element of fraud was
present and the burden of proof was heavier under lOb-5 than under
section 18, plaintiff should be allowed to proceed under section 10(b).
It should be noted, however, that the emerging trend today is to narrow the scope of actions possible under section 10(b). Consistent with
this trend, some district courts are resolving the issue presented in Ross
in the opposite manner. 8
Mark Manovich
88.

See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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